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TP.E INFLUENCE OF REPRESENTATION IN 
INTRASTATE GRANT DISBURSEMENT 
A common rationale in allocating government grants and aid is income 
redistribution. Consider receipts by individuals for example. Under a 
host of programs, economic hardship is a necessary and often sufficient 
condition for receiving benefits. A second major beneficiary category for 
federal and state aid is municipalities and localities. There again equity 
considerations frequently affect grant receipts, although purely demo-
graphic factors such as population can also influence the level of assis-
tance. Considered together, one would expect disbursements across these 
two broad aid categories to be explained by varying economic and demo-
graphic factors consistent with the intended equity rationale. Recently, 
however, economists have begun to question the primacy of the proff ered 
redistributive motive. They suggest instead that political influence 
vested in committee assignments, chairmanships, and legislative tenure 
accounts significantly, if not exclusively, for the allocation of federal 
grants across states. At present, the empirical support for this hypo-
thesis is growing, but neither overwhelming nor without its critics. 
Perhaps the fairest assessment of the empirical literature on this is~ue is 
tha t it is in its incipiency. 
The present paper offers an extension of the empirical research 
conducted up to this point. Previous studies verifying the political 
influence hypothesis have dealt with the flow of federal dollars across 
states. However, no research to date has traced the distribution of 
federal/state monies to the ultimate recipients, localities within the 
states. This extended focus i~ important bec~use varying locality traits, 
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conceivably lost in aggregated state data, may be the more appropriate 
testing ground for distinguishing the effects Df political influence from 
deliberate policy criteria in grant disbursements. Using data for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, this paper examines whether political or policy 
variables better explain grant receipts at two separate lev els : (1) state 
allocations to localit ies; and (2) federal allocations to localities. 
Section! contains a brief review of the empirical literature. 
Section II introduces the data and describes the model and estima tion pro -
cedure. The empi ric al results are presented in Section III. Section IV 
discusses the implications of our findings for policy as well as for past 
and future empirical studies in this area. 
I. The Poli tics of Grant Receipts Literature 
Stigler was the f irst to model the relationship between political 
d . . 1 power an economic assistance. Using the distribution of federal grants 
and non-defense employment across states as measures of legisla tor perfor-
mance, Stigler estimated the relative effectiveness of senators versus 
house representatives. His results indicate d that two senators are roughly 
equal to a state's entire house delegation in terms of securing fede ral 
grants and almost two and one-half times more product ive in garnering 
employment dollars for their state. As Stigler noted, however, these 
estima t ed weights were not robust. Furthermore, the mode l itself was 
rather simplistic. 
A conceptual improvement within t he Stigler prototype was int rodu ced 
by Crain and Tollison. 2 They stressed that Stigler's specification was 
implicitly a "one man-one vote " model and thus ignores the likely relation-
ship between congressional tenure and political influence via seniority 
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rules. After weighting states' house and senate delegations based on total 
time in office, Crain and Tollison found that " the total age of the House 
delegation is a powerful explaine r of ... expenditure proportions across 
states." 3 It is noteworthy, however, that the senate variable, adjusted 
for tenure, becomes insignificant. Though counter to Stigler ' s results, 
Crain and Tollison interpret this reversal as entirely cons istent with the 
constitutional role of the House versus the Senate in framing appropria -
tions bil ls . Another interesting aspect of their find in gs is that senior -
ity, while significantly raising political influence, appears to reflect 
diminishing returns. 
Despite their statistical significance, the empirical studies noted 
above display spec i fica ti on bias. This point was emphasi zed by Greene and 
. 11 . . 4 Munl ey in a response to Crain - To ~ison. The thrust of their criticism was 
that the explanatory strength attributed to delegation tenure in the house 
fol lo wed from its high correlation with population , a variable excluded 
from the model but often a major consideration in federal aid formulas. In 
a rep ly, while defending their specif i cation, Crain and Tol lison concur 
with their critics that the separate effects are intractable when dealing 
with aggregated state data: 
Unfortunately, as Green e and Munley seem to recognize, there is no 
easy way to untangle the sepa ra te effects of r epresentation and 
population on the distribution of spending across states . The 
relevant data on expenditures, representation, and population are 
aggregated to the state level, and, as a consequence, the size of a 
state's congressional delegation is clea r ly going to -be highly related 
to its population. The mathematics of apportionment guarantee such a 
rel ation. This high correlation between representat~on and population 
creates a problem for both Greene and Munley and us . 
This comment is espec i ally pertinent to our paper. Since we will be using 
locality data in examinin~ the flow of tederal grants , our specification 
will be able to capture the separate effects of population and house tenure. 
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!n some respects, thP. strongest results supporting the political 
:..--::2.uence hypothesis were cbtained by Holcombe ar:d Zardkoohi . 6 3y lir:-.iting 
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variables reflecting economic need. Using a log - l i nea r form, their model 
regressed economic assistance grants per capita against seven explanatory 
variables, three political and four policy oriented . The political vari -
ables included ·t he mean length of tenure of a state's senators, the percen -
tage of a s t ate's rep r esentatives belong i ng to the majority party in the 
P.ouse, and a dummy variable indicating whethe r a state had cong r essmen on 
either the Senate Finance or the House Appropriations Committee . The 
policy va r iables were the state ' s population , percent of population below 
poverty, per capita income , and the percent of t he population in met ro -
politan areas. It is notable that all of the political variables were 
significant . It is even more remarkable, and rather disconcerting , that 
none of the policy variables significantly acco unted for dispersion of 
economic assistance grant ac ross states . 
The Holcombe and Zardkoohi finding is especially curious when compared 
to t he r esu l ts of a more recent paper by McKenzie and Yandle . 7 They test 
whether changes in a state ' s delegation size effected its share of fe deral 
funds. In t erestingly, t heir results suggest diseconomies t o delega t i on 
size. More per ti nent to the t his paper, however , is their finding of a 
negative and h i ghly s i gn i ficant relationship between state income and 
federal aid. This result indicates that the fede r al aid system is or iented 
toward income redistribution. 
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II. A Model of Grant Disbursements to Localities 
As the foregoing review reveals, the empirical tests of the political 
influence hypothesis have returned mixed results . As we have already 
indicated, part of the debate reduces to a data problem. However, we also 
believe that errors in specification account for some of the conflicting 
results. The present paper is addressed to both issues. Though in general 
we adopt the Holcombe-Zardkoohi model, several specification adjustments 
are incorporated. Our hybrid model is then used to examine separately the 
basis on which federal and state grants are . distributed to localities 
within the Commonwealth. 
All grant and aid data are from the Virginia's "Comparative Report of 
Local Government Revenues and Expenditures for 1981." Demographic and 
income data are from the "1980 Census of Population." There are several 
advantageous features of the data sources that should be highlighted. 
First, in all matters of public accounting, cities and counties in .Virginia 
are treated uniformly and as separate locali ties. Therefore, one does not 
face the problem, say, as in the case of Illinois, of differentiating aid 
received by Chicago for reasons unique from those determining receipts by 
Cook County. The expenditure data reported for Virginia is also valuable 
because it clearly distinguishes the categorical and non-categorical 
components of both state and federal aid as it is distributed to 136 
}!!-·-· '· 
localities. A further convenient 'fact of the data is that the locality 
definitions used in the public accounts correspond to the report ing units 
use0. in 1980 Census. Thus, the demographic and income observntions corres-
pond well with the relatively small geographic regions to which grants 
flow . In sum, the data i _s highly uniforn and disaggregated. This latter 
feature is important because, as previously indicated, more highly aggre-
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ga~ed data makes the separate affects of House representation and popula-
':ion in grant d-i .sbursements intractable. The only likely criticism of our 
data is that it is exclusively for Virginia. Though this fact may seem at 
first to preclude any broader regional relevance f or our findings, one may 
argue that several characteristics of the state perhaps qualify it as 
. 8 
:::-epresentative. 
Following F.olcombe and Zardkoohi, the dependant vari~ble in our model 
includes only categorical state and federal aid. Major components of 
categorical aid are incom~-tested programs, revenue sharing, and assistance 
to local educational. If such funds are administered strictly according to 
policy criteria, disbursements should correlate positively with demographic 
variables and negatively with income variables. For example, education 
funds should depend on number of students, for which population is a 
reasonable proxy. Population is also a factor in revenue sharing formulas . 
Regarding income - tested programs, receipts should be high in localities 
with low per capita income and/or high instances of poverty. 
The major difference between estimating a state versus federal dis-
bursements model lies in the specification of the political variables. The 
state aid model includes five political variables. SENATE is the time in 
office of each locality's state senator. Generally, senate representation 
spans more than one locality. 9 Due. to multiple delegate representation in 
several localities, assessing political power in the House o!: Delegates 
warrants two variables. DELEGATE is the average length of service by a 
localities delegation and DELEGATE TENURE is the time in office of the most 
. . 10 h f. senior representative. Te COMMITTEE speci ication follows Holcombe and 
Zardkoohi; a dummy equal to l !:or locali ties with Assembly members on 
either the Senate Finance or House Appropriations Coimlittee, and equal to 0 
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otherwise. CHAIRNAN. is a second dummy variable reflecting whether a 
senator or delegate is a co!M!littee chairman . Combining these political 
variables with policy variables yields the following model for state 
disbursements: 
(1) SCAT= a+ 8 1 POP+ 82 I NCOME + 83 POVERTY+ 84 URBAN 
+ 85 SENATE+ 86 DELEGATE+ 87 DELEGATE TENURE 
• 85 COMMITTEE+ 89 CHAIRl'l.AN + £ 
where SCAT is the level of state categorical aid, POP is population , INCOME 
is per capita i nco me, POVERTY is the number of perso ns below 125% of 
official poverty level, and URBAN is a dummy for urban versus rural as 
defined •in the 1980 Census. I= state categorical aid is being distributed 
to localities under various objective criteria of need, differences in . 
receipt levels should be positively related .with population, numbers in 
poverty, and urban characteristi c s. A truly redistributive grant system 
should also show a negative relation with per capita income . A positive 
sign on any of the political variables is evidence of polit i cal influence 
in the distribution of state grants. 
Unhappily , extending the model to explain federal grants causes most 
of the pol it ical variables to dr op out. The most obvious deletion is the 
Senate variable since every locali ty is represented by the same two United 
States Senators . However, it also turns out that the cornnittee and chair -
manship variables must be dropped . This is due to a coincidence that none 
of Virginia's Congressmen se r ved in either category in 1981. Therefore, 
the federal aid model retains only one political variable --t he varying 
t enure of House members from the ten Virginia Congressional districts. 11 
Usi ng th e same policy variables as before, the federal categorical aid 
(FCAT) equation is written: 
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(2) FCAT =a+ 61 POP+ 62 INCOME• S3 POVERTY+ 64 URBAN 
+ 65 HOUSE TENURE+ E 
Both models are run in three different functiona l forms: (1) linear, 
(2) non-li near, and (3) log -linear. The reasons for the three foms is tc 
facilitate comparisons of our model with previous studies. 
III. Empirical Results 
The regression results for state categorical aid appear in Table 1. 
Generally, the results are of high statistical quality and seem to indicate 
quite clearly that state aid is distributed to localities in close keeping 
with the objective criteria. Obse.rve that, under the linear form, all of 
the policy coefficients are of the predicted sign and highly significant. 
Regarding political influence, two of the five variables display signifi-
cant positive effects. It is interesting, and perhaps reasonable from an 
institutional perspective, that committee appointments and chairmanships 
carry greater influence than the simple longevity factor implicit in the 
SENATE, DELEGATE, and DELEGATE TENURE specifications. 
The non-linear form of the state aid equation was run in deference to 
Crain and Tollison's finding that political power vested in longevity 
exhibits diminishing returns. If this is the case, the SENATE, DELEGATE, 
and TENURE observations should be run as the log rather ~han t he leve l of 
time in legislative service. The reader may verify, however, that this 
adjustment leaves the results largely unaltered. The only notable change 
is that the income coefficient falls from the five to ten percent signifi-
cance level. 
The log-linear form is the specification used by Holcombe and Zardkoohi. 
Recall that they found powerful support for the political influence hypo -
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Table 1: Regression Results Explaining State Categorical Aid 
Dependent Variable: Linear Non-L inear t Log- Linear 
Variable 
POPULATION 0.163 * 0.164* 1.182 * 
(29.47) (29.83) (12.33) 
INCOME - 0.377** - 0.282 -0.589* 
( 1. 89) (1.46) (3. 03) 
POVERTY 0.252* 0.263* - 0 . 085 
(5.62) (6. ,05) (0.94) 
URBAN 2313 . 440* 204.7 . 00 * 0,041 
(3 . 60) (~.25) (0.55) 
SENATE -78.44 7 -63.05 - 0 .007 
( 1. 34) (1.11) (1. 06) 
DELEGATE - 55.739 607 .1 90 0.113 
(0.53) (0. 75) (1. 30) 
DELEGATE 23.124 - 549.797 -0.104 
TENURE (0.34) (0.69) (1.23) 
COMMITTEE 573.546* 495.269** 0.025 
(2.58) (2 . 26) (0. 4 7) 
CHAIRMAN 451 . 869* 354.998** -0.003 
(2 . 00) (1.67) (0 . 06) 
Intercept 2021. 40 997.431 9.332 
(1.47) (0.85) (5.87) 
R- squared 0.973' 0.973 0 . 947 
F-Statistic 503.94 504.87 252.20 
Observat ions 136 136 136 
* The parenthesis contain t - statistics. An aster i ck denotes that the 
coefficient is significant at t he l\ level. 
** Coefficient is significant at the~\ level . 
t The logged independent variables .a re Sena te, Delegate, and Delegate 
Tenure. 
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thesis and virtually r.o evidence of any policy criteria being met . Our 
results ·suggest just the opposite occurs at the state level. POPULATION 
and INCOME are dominant in the equation with all other variables becoming 
insignificant. More thorough comparisons with Holcombe-Zardkoohi ·will be 
drawn shortly. For the moment, merely note that our findings question the 
appropriateness of the log - linear specification . 
Table 2 contains the results explaining federal disbursement to 
localities. Observe that in the linear estimation POPULATION and POVERTY 
are the only significant coefficients. The insignificance of HOUSE TENURE 
warrants special elaboration . Recall the Greene - Munley comment that pre-
vious findings of House influence were actually poorly specified population 
effects. Also recall that our federal/locality data afford a ~nique test 
of this issue. In the simple linear case, our results suggest that popula -
tion is the explanatory variable. It is indeed noteworthy, however, that 
when HOUSE TENURE is non-linearly specified in keeping with the Crain -
Tol lison diminishing political returns hypothesis, TENURE emerges, in 
addition to POPULATION and POVERTY, as highly significant. 
Regarding the log - linear form, verify once again that this specifica -
tion completely eliminates otherwise significant coefficients. Our results, 
as well as our intuition, prompts us to serious l y question the constant 
elastlcity assumption that this specification imposes on the relationship 
between grant distribution and policy/political variables. We believe the 
log - linear form contributes partly to the lack of policy significance 
reported by Holcombe - Zardkoohi. Further specification issues contributing 
to their findings rest in their treatment of population and poverty, both 
highly significant var ia bles in our model . Regarding population, Holcombe -
Zardkoohi use per capita grants as the dependant variable and then interpret 
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Table 2: Regression Results Explaining Federal Categorical Aid 
Dependent Variabl ·e : Linear Non- Linear t · Log-Linear 
Variable 
POPULATION 0 . 373* 0 . 385* 0.506 
(15 . 73) (16.65) (0.50) 
INCOME - 0 . 619 0.623 - 1.342 
(0.75) (0 . 73) (0 . 64) 
POVERTY 1. 836* 1.820* 1.112 
(10. 35) (10.69) (1.16) 
URBAN - 3640 . 06 - 3688.95 -1. 248** 
(1. 35) (1. 43) (1.66) 
HOUSE 224.453 1191. 43* -0 . 117 
TENURE (0.85) (3 . 32) (1.23} 
Intercept -2881.18 - 10796 . 20 11. 456 
( 0. 43) (1.87) (0.66) 
R- squared 0.936 0 . 941 o. 213 
F- Statistic 376.97 409.27 6.95 
Observations f 134 134 134 
* The parenthesis contain t - statistics. An asterick denotes that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** Coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
, The logged independent variables are Senate, Delegate, and Delegate 
Tenure . 
f Two Virginia localities received no federal categorical aid. 
-12 -
an insignificant sign on the population coefficient as indicating no 
influence. In fact, the more reasonable interpretation of the insignifi-
cant population coefficient is that the per capita grant fonn of the depen -
dent variable is adjusted for population affects. A truer test of popula -
tion's influence would seem to cast, as we have done, total rather than 
per capita grants as the dependent variable . 12 Regarding their poverty 
variable, Holcombe-Zardkoohi use the percent rather than the number of 
persons in poverty. This is clearly inappropriate since the level of 
income-tested receipt3 to individuals in an area are based on formulas of 
I 
· 13 
abso l ute, not relative need . Though our focus on federal disbursenents 
is limi ted to one state, t his experience with the general research question 
leads us to conclude that the Holcombe - Zardkoohi model which found such 
overwhelm ing support for the political influence hypothesis is conceptually 
flawed. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Regarding state disbursements, the results indicat e that categorical 
distributions are closely honed to objective policy criteria. However, our 
findings also support the not surprising conclusion that politics do 
matter. Indee d, we find that the nodal points of political influence on 
the state level are committee appoint ments and chairmanships. As for 
federal grants, we also find that disbursements to localities conform to 
stated policy criteria. Although the correspondence is not as strong as 
that displayed by state administered aid, it is impo rtant consideri ng the 
concluzions to the contrary in previous studies , particul arly Holcombe -
Zardkoohi ' s. We believe some of their results follow from specification 
bias. 
-1 3-
In the Introduction, we noted that all previous tests of the political 
influence hypothesis have focused on the flow of federal disbursements 
across states. Our thesis was that since the vast share of federal money 
received by states is ultimately received by loc al ities , tests of this 
hypothesis must focus on how aid is distributed with respect to locality, 
not just state profiles . Arguablely, varying locality traits for which 
categorical aid is legitimately awarded are likely to be diluted in agg re-
gated state aata. Generally, we find strong support for the importance of 
locality - level analysis. Locali ty-level analysis of other states should be 
added to the Public Choice agenda o'"f future research. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 George J. Stigler, "The Sizes of Legislatures ," Journal of Legal Studies 
(January 1976), 17-34 . 
2 w. Mark Cra in and Robert Tol lis on, "The Influen ce of Representation on 
Public Policy ," Journal o f Legal Stud i es (June 1977), 355 - 361 . 
3 
4 
5 
-6 
7 
8 
Ibid., p. 357. 
Kenneth V. Greene and Vincent G. Munley, "The P~oductiv ity of Legis:-
lators' Tenure : A Cas e of Lacking Evidence, " Journal of Legal Studies 
(J anu a ry 1981) , 207 -214 . 
"Representation and Influence : A Reply," Journal of Legal Studies 
(J anuary 1981), 215 - 21~ . 
Randall G. Holcombe and Asghar Zardk oohi, ''The Determinants of Federa l 
Grants," Southern Economic Journal (October 1981), 393-399 . 
Richard B. McKenzie and Bruce Yandle, "The Flow of Federal Funds to the 
States - The Impact of Delegation Size, " Presented Paper SEA Meeting, 
November 10 - 12 , 1982 . 
For example, Virginia ' s 1980 per capita income in the current dollars was 
not far from the mean for the United States, $5,250 versus S5,322 
respe ctively . Virginia also has what might be regarded as a desirable 
balance in terms of population densities, urban and suburban northern 
Virginia as compared to the more sparsely populated southwestern 
regions. 
9 Forty state senators represent 136 loc alities . I n all but a very few 
cases , political dist rict s conformed to locality boundaries . 
10 
11 
12 
13 
~hese variables are similar in spir it to Crain and Tollison ' s. One 
notable d i fference , however, is that we use average length of a 
delegation ' s service rather than total . We feel this adjus t ment 
lessens the collineari ty between pcpulation and a delegation ' s total 
service time . 
In other words, there are only ~en different observations for th i~ 
variable and they are assigned to localities according to congres-
sional district i ng. 
This point has been v~~ified by McKenzie and Yandle . One form of th eir 
model regres ses tot al f ederal grants against population and finds the 
coefficient highly significant . In a later per capita g rant specifi-
C3tion, they app ropriate ly remove po pulation f rom the right - hand side . 
Consider the following case which was typical of our data . Alexandria 
Virginia had 1366 perso ns at 125% o f poverty leve l whi ch represents 
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12.7% of the locality population. Bedford, on the other ha nd, had 
only 174 persons so classified and yet these accounted for 17 .9% of 
the popula tion . It is obvious that the l evel of inco me-tested aid 
flowing to Alexand r ia should be higher, correlating with numbers not 
percentages in poverty~ · 
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